CAPRI’s reports “Zero Murders: Searching for Lessons from Two Decades of Anti-Violence Interventions in August Town,” and “Testing, Testing: Challenges to Measuring Social Programmes for At-Risk Youth,” introduced a critical perspective to the citizen security discourse in Jamaica with regard to the efficacy of social interventions that aim to reduce armed violence. Since then, we have noted several defenses of the value of social interventions proffered by intervention practitioners, academics, and politicians; these tend to cite individual success stories and put forward counterfactuals such as the conviction that, without social interventions, the situation would be worse (i.e. there would be more violence and murder). We continue to conduct evidence-based research on strategies to reduce Jamaica’s extraordinarily high murder rate, working with new frameworks for understanding the problem, and proffering innovative solutions. Our intention here is to clarify CAPRI's critique of social interventions and outline the approach our current citizen security research has adopted with regard to reducing armed violence in Jamaica.
Anti-violence social interventions in Jamaica are diverse, and discussions around their impact on violence reduction often lack the necessary precision for constructive dialogue. Broadly, these interventions, recently re-named by some “social investments,” can be divided into two categories: those aimed at behavioural-change, such as skills training and conflict resolution, and those targeting improvements in individual and community infrastructure, like upgrading physical spaces and formalising identities through documentation. The critique in CAPRI’s reports is primarily of the first type of intervention; the work currently underway finds far greater value in, and promotes and calls for an expansion of the second. This approach is grounded in the understanding that Jamaica’s violence problem is predominantly gang-related. Our data-driven research carefully considers the factors contributing to the dynamics of organized violence. Additionally, it builds on proven concepts and solutions that have been effective elsewhere..
CAPRI's evidence-driven conclusion on the efficacy of behavioural-change-type social interventions does not amount to a blanket dismissal of their value; it is a call to re-evaluate their application to armed violence reduction in Jamaica. Achieving a significant reduction in violence requires dismantling gangs, who are the primary violence producers. Improving educational and employment opportunities for people in disadvantaged communities is obviously a desirable objective. However, such interventions fall short in effecting the widespread community and systemic reforms required to reduce violence orchestrated by gangs to serve their interests. That is, there is a mismatch between the intended purpose of these interventions and their suitability for addressing the specific challenges of gang violence in Jamaica. CAPRI’s studies currently underway apply a framework that promotes policies which prioritise the dismantling of gangs, which are the main violence producers.
This reframing of the problem of Jamaica’s high murder rate as primarily an outcome of organized violence calls for interventions that focus on transforming the urban informal communities that incubate and shelter gangs. Interventions that comprise upgrading infrastructure and regularising land tenure, not only disrupt gang operations but also improve residents’ quality of life and economic prospects.
As communities become integrated in the mainstream social and economic life of the country, they cease to function as gang safe havens. There is ample evidence from around the world—Peru and Colombia are two regional examples--that these land tenure reform and infrastructural investments are more likely to yield long-term reductions in violence compared to behavioural-change-type interventions. However, the scale and scope of such initiatives in Jamaica are presently too limited, and lack the emphasis they deserve. We elaborate on these ideas in our forthcoming report on the Zones of Special Operations (ZOSOs).
Prioritizing the removal of gangs as the main focus for violence reduction will also impact the rate of interpersonal murders, which account for approximately 20 percent of all homicides. Dismantling gang structures would mitigate the “impunity effect”—the perception among potential offenders that the risk of arrest is minimal, making murder a viable option for conflict resolution. Law enforcement agencies unburdened by gang violence could reallocate resources to improve investigation and resolution rates for all murders, enhancing overall deterrence. Further, with fewer gangs, the pool of potential contract killers would also reduce,
leading to fewer options for individuals to resort to such extreme measures for resolving personal issues.
Structural changes contain more promise for immediate and long-lasting decreases in violence than traditional behavioural-change-type interventions. Jamaica's high murder rate impacts not only the loss of life, but hampers economic growth, fuels brain drain, exacerbates poverty, and diminishes quality of life. Those in vulnerable communities bear the brunt of these impacts, which curtail their potential for self-actualisation and improving the life chances of their children. The obligation on all citizen security and adjacent stakeholders is to champion only those interventions with demonstrable efficacy in making communities inhospitable to violent gangs. Behavioural-change-type social interventions fail to meet that criterion.
Some social interventions focused on behavioral change can complement structural and systemic approaches; however, their main objective should be to bolster initiatives oriented toward structural reform, with the majority of resources allocated to these priorities. Moving away from behaviour change-focused interventions to those which centre systemic, structural, community-level change promises significant and sustained reductions in violence. This strategic shift could steer Jamaica away from the cycles of violence that have dominated our post-independence trajectory.