Having sustained budget deficits 18 years prior to 2014, the government of Jamaica, is now on a progressive trajectory (arguably a slow one), to align the ‘fundamentals’ of the economy. With focus on a new growth agenda, while working to remain on target as the IMF programme comes to an end and the initiations of numerous reformation programmes, the possibilities are hopeful.

In the midst came a reminder, of a simple cliché – ‘expect the unexpected’. The United Kingdom (UK) made the decision to terminate its membership in the European Union (EU), a situation best known as Brexit. The complete effects of Brexit are still vague, where the only certainty is uncertainty. Though still faint, regions such as the Caribbean that are highly vulnerable to changes in the global economic system cannot afford to “wait and see” what outcomes might transpire. Prudence and decisive action are both necessary to minimize negative impact, but also to maximize on emerging opportunities from Brexit.

The dramatic drop in the British pound’s value, creates a negative outlook for the British economy in the short term. This economic volatility can pose threats for businesses both in the Caribbean and in the UK, the Caribbean tourism industry, and remittances. Furthermore Jamaica exports approximately US$81m worth of goods to the UK in 2014, an amount that represents 5.7% of its total exports. However, this is not to say that opportunities aren’t on the horizon.

The Caribbean should respond to Brexit and its implications with renewed focus on CARICOM’s mandate for regionalism. A collective effort will better position the region to bargain new trade deals with the UK, as well as capitalize on potential benefits emerging from Brexit (see story on page 4).

With international stirs, there remain local pressing concerns. Jamaican tax data show that 3 percent of all taxpayers pay 80 per cent of the country’s taxes (MOF, 2012). For this reason, increasing tax compliance justifiably needs to be a focal point for Jamaica’s prosperity efforts. Increasing compliance can create fiscal space for the government to manoeuvre and reduce the burden from the minority of the population.

Consistent with this recommendation, the Tax Administration Jamaica (TAJ) is focused on increasing its efficiency and effectiveness in an effort to improve compliance and increase revenues. In order to accomplish this it has devised the National Compliance Plan based on encouraging voluntary compliance through service, education and enforcement (see story on page 12). CAPRI maintains that these initiatives must be grounded in making the process of filing taxes easier, decreasing reliance on direct taxes such as income tax and eliminating tax exemption. CAPRI will publish its report on tax compliance in the coming quarter.

In the midst of such reforms, as Jamaica seeks to get the ‘fundamentals’ right, the environment’s preservation, by no means, can be overlooked. With mounting environmental concerns about pollution and almost annual fires at disposal sites (the most devastating of which cost $200 million to extinguish), there have been calls to privatise the National Solid Waste Management Authority (NSWMA). Proponents of privatisation have argued that private sector involvement could lead to greater levels of efficiency in solid waste management (SWM) and reduce pressure on the government’s budget. Ultimately, privatising the NSWMA can reap benefits for Jamaica, but only if it’s done right and the right foundation is laid (see story on page 9).

While this quarter’s Think Tank provides commentary on these three important areas, CAPRI, in its efforts to inform research-based decisions, has also made public, other reports and briefs with more in-depth information and recommendations concerning these issues and more. They can be accessed on our website at capricaribbean.com/publications.
An engaging discussion following CAPRI’s assessment of the NHT. From left: Dr. Marshall Hall, Chairman – CAPRI; Dr. the Hon. Christopher Tufton, Minister of Health; Mrs. Imani Duncan-Price, Co-Executive Director – CAPRI; Dr. Damien King, Co-Executive Director – CAPRI; Mr. Earl Jarret, Director – CAPRI.

SEPTEMBER 5, 2016

High-level panel discussing the implications of ‘Brexit’ for the Caribbean. From left: Hon. Bruce Golding, former Prime Minister of Jamaica & Chairman of the CARICOM Review Commission; His Excellency David Fitton, UK High Commissioner to Jamaica; Dr. Dana Dixon, Executive Business Development & Research – Jamaica National Building Society.

JUNE 29, 2016

Hon. Fayval Williams – Minister without portfolio in the Ministry of Finance and Planning – listening keenly to a question from the audience at the launch of CAPRI’s report on Mobile PATH payments.

JUNE 27, 2016

Professor Maurice McNaughton presenting the findings of the report on Mobile PATH payments.

JUNE 27, 2016

Former Jamaica Minister of Youth and Culture Lisa Hanna, and U.S Ambassador to Jamaica, Luis G. Moreno, exchange a few thoughts as CAPRI’s “Dialogues Between Democracies: Youth Perspectives” forum draws to a close. This event was the fifth in a series of discussions organised in conjunction with the Embassy of the United States in Kingston.

APRIL 4, 2016
“Brexit” refers to the United Kingdom’s (UK) decision to terminate its membership in the European Union (EU), an economic and political partnership comprised of 28 European Countries. The complete repercussions of this decision are yet to manifest. However, considerable implications for the Caribbean in the short to medium term in regards to trade, development aid, remittances, and tourism are likely. The Caribbean should respond to Brexit and its implications with renewed focus on CARICOM’s mandate for regionalism. A collective effort will better position the region to negotiate new trade deals with the UK, as well as capitalize on potential benefits emerging from Brexit.

THE BRITISH CONTEXT
In his 2015 re-election campaign, UK Prime Minister, David Cameron, promised to hold a referendum on the UK’s EU membership. The referendum date was set for June 23, 2016, and the UK became divided between the respective “Leave” and “Remain” campaigns. “Leave” campaigners’ main concern was the UK’s sovereignty, in light of the “super state” nature of the EU. They stated that leaving the EU would grant the UK greater control over its allocation of funds, trade, and immigration policy. The “Remain” campaign insisted that EU membership offered more benefits than drawbacks, emphasizing that other EU member states were vital trading partners for the UK, and positing that most immigrants were valuable contributors to the UK’s economy.

With a 71.8% voter turnout, the largest since the 1992 election, the Leave campaign emerged victorious with 52% of the vote (BBC). The referendum’s results exposed divisions in the UK more nuanced than simply “Leave” versus “Remain”. Voting cleavages occurred along class, age, and regional lines. Cities such as London, which had become technology driven and advanced under globalization, and the period of EU membership, voted to remain, while other cities that had not benefitted as much from the EU voted to leave. Scotland voted overwhelmingly to remain with the EU, while England comprised the lion’s share of the leave vote. This voting pattern has fueled fears that Scotland will use Brexit to wrest its independence from the UK, ultimately resulting in the UK’s fragmentation.¹

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CARIBBEAN
Brexit is not the first time the Caribbean has had to respond to sudden flux in the UK’s relationship with Europe. In 1973, the UK decided to join the European Economic Community (EEC), an embryonic EU. This decision meant the end of the UK’s predominant trade with the Commonwealth, the formation of the Caribbean Common Market, later CARICOM, and the emergence of the African, Caribbean, and Pacific Group of States (ACP). It was through ACP-EU relations, and subsequent Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), that the Caribbean’s relationship with the EU proceeded.

The Caribbean’s respective historical relationships with the UK and EU, along with its high vulnerability to external economic shocks, ensure that Brexit will have considerable implications for the region. No conclusive long-term effects can be guaranteed, but short and medium term effects can be inferred.

Trade is one aspect of Caribbean-EU and Caribbean-UK relations on which Brexit will certainly have an effect. For example, Jamaica exported approximately US$81m worth of goods to the UK in 2014, an amount that represents 5.7% of its total exports. However, this trading relationship, and its formative benefits for Jamaica, is subject to change in light of Brexit. While EPAs are bound to the EU and will thus remain intact, bilateral trade agreements with the UK will need to be renegotiated. Once the UK formally exits the EU, it may be willing to grant preferential terms that it previously could not, but it will also have to recalibrate with every region with which it has trade relations. Hence, any new benefits for the Caribbean region may largely depend on its place in the UK’s hierarchy of interests and the Caribbean’s ability to negotiate.

Trade between CARIFORUM (CARICOM and the Dominican Republic) and the EU is currently valued at €8 billion in 2011. However, a formal Brexit will release the UK from the CARIFORUM-EU Partnership agreement. CARIFORUM will thus be granted more agency over its economic destiny, with the UK and EU respectively, which can work to its benefit provided it responds effectively.

Concerns about how Overseas Development Aid (ODA) will be affected are also legitimate. The EU allocates development aid via the European Development Fund (EDF). A total of €30.5 billion was allocated for the ACP region for the period 2014-2020. The UK provides 14.7% of this fund, making it the third largest contributor after Germany and France. Hence, Brexit will significantly reduce the financial resources that the EU has at its disposal for the next EDF. Does this mean that future EU development projects will have to be scaled back? How will the UK allocate these funds once they are not bound to EU regulations? There are fears that the UK will become more inward looking in efforts to recover from the economic shocks associated with Brexit. There also remains the possibility that Brexit will mean the UK’s re-engagement with the Commonwealth, but neither possible outcome can be determined at this point with certainty.

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2 The Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC) (2016).
The immense uncertainty surrounding Brexit has contributed to the dramatic drop in the British pound’s value, and a negative outlook for the British economy in the short term. This economic volatility can pose threats for businesses both in the Caribbean and in the UK, the Caribbean tourism industry, and remittances. Caribbean businesses operating in the UK must consider their investments in the pound, and assess risks of contagion in other EU member states. For many Caribbean countries, tourism is a significant contributor to GDP, but the Brexit uncertainty could see tourist numbers from the UK decrease. Finally, remittances are essential for Caribbean nations and are a well-targeted form of social support. In Jamaica, for instance, remittances equate to 16.7 percent of GDP, 14 percent of which comes from the UK. The devaluation of the pound means that a given remittance is not worth as much to the economy as it was pre-Brexit. Since remittances tend to be used on regular consumer goods, local businesses in the Caribbean can be affected by this decreased purchasing power. Since these issues flowing from uncertainty are based on the general population’s perceptions of the future, they are virtually unavoidable and difficult to mitigate.

Tremendous efforts for awareness and enlightenment on the subject have been pursued by CAPRI with much support from the University of the West Indies Mona, directly assisted by Vice Chancellor Hillary Beckles in our hosting of a Brexit symposium held at the UWI Mona undercraft.

**POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS**

The complete effects of Brexit are still uncertain, making it difficult to make concrete policy recommendations. However, regions such as the Caribbean that are highly vulnerable to changes in the global economic system cannot afford to “wait and see” what outcomes might transpire. Prudence and decisive action are both necessary to minimize negative impact, but also maximize on emerging opportunities from Brexit.

A crucial precaution is to ensure that CARICOM is fulfilling its mandate by addressing concerns of CARICOM’s legitimacy. CARICOM’s inclusion of Brexit on their agenda for their 37th Heads of Government Meeting is evidence of a desire for action as a region. Moreover, Jamaica’s formation of a CARICOM Review Commission offers some hope for a strengthened ACP-CARIFORUM framework. With stronger regionalism through CARICOM, the Caribbean will have greater leverage in “making the UK’s priority list” to renegotiate trade deals, and a stronger presence in its relations with the EU.

The Caribbean should also actively research the opportunities that might emerge from Brexit in regards to trade, labour, and development aid. Researching the possible outcomes will ensure the region is poised to seize existing opportunities or take action should an opportunity arise.
**HUMAN RESOURCES SYSTEM**

**OBJECTIVE:**
Fully implement a human resources software system (the HCMES system; including payroll)

**ACTION:**
Establish a full-time project management team

**DEADLINE:**
January 31, 2016

**STATUS:**
Completed

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**POST-CLEARANCE AUDIT UNIT**

**OBJECTIVE:**
Increase capacity of the Post-Clearance Audit unit in the Jamaica Customs Agency (JCA)

**ACTION:**
Hire 15 additional auditors

**DEADLINE:**
March 31, 2016

**STATUS:**
Completed

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**ACCOUNTANT GENERAL’S DEPARTMENT**

**OBJECTIVE:**
Have the Corporate Management Development branch of the Ministry of Finance and Public Service approve a new organizational structure for the Accountant General’s Department

**ACTION:**
Submit for approval

**DEADLINE:**
September 2016

**STATUS:**
On schedule

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**PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM**

**OBJECTIVE:**
Draft an action plan with specific timelines for public sector transformations towards improved efficiency, quality and cost effectiveness of the public sector

**ACTION:**
Submit for approval

**DEADLINE:**
September 2016

**STATUS:**
On schedule

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**PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM**

**OBJECTIVE:**
Draft a consultation paper for the resolution framework for the entire financial sector to further enhance the arrangements for financial crisis preparedness and management

**ACTION:**
Draft Consultation Paper

**DEADLINE:**
October 31, 2016

**STATUS:**
On schedule
CRACKERS DESIGNED FOR SNACKERS

#MarvellouslyMoreish #GetsYourTastebudsTalking
Jamaica produces roughly 800,000 tons of waste each year, 57 percent of which is compostable, and 39 percent of which is recyclable. Yet, most of Jamaica’s waste is simply dumped at unsanitary and sometimes unsecured landfills. With mounting environmental concerns about pollution and almost annual fires at disposal sites (the most devastating of which cost J$200 million to extinguish), there have been calls to privatise the National Solid Waste Management Authority (NSWMA). But should the authority be privatised? If it should, which elements of waste management should be privatised and to what extent? And what lessons can be learnt from other countries who have privatised solid waste management?

In its strictest sense, ‘privatisation’ is the sale to private owners of state-owned assets. More loosely, privatisation describes cases where public services have been contracted out to private firms, and where public authorities remain legally responsible for public services. The NSWMA was established by the National Solid Waste Management Act (2001) to “take all such steps as are necessary for the effective management of solid waste in Jamaica in order to safeguard public health, ensure that the waste is collected, stored, transported, recycled, reused or disposed of, in an environmentally sound manner and promote safety standards in relation to such waste.” However, financial and human resource constraints, compounded by poor road conditions in particularly informal communities, have inhibited the NSWMA’s ability to effectively execute its function. Proponents of privatisation have argued that private sector involvement could lead to greater levels of efficiency in solid waste management (SWM) and reduce pressure on the government’s budget. But does privatisation work in practice? Let’s look at some case studies to discern relevant lessons for Jamaica.

THE BAHAMAS
The Bahamas, in 2014, privatised a large portion of its solid waste management services. Companies like Bahamas Waste and Advanced Disposal were awarded contracts for waste collection. A company called Renew Bahamas was awarded a 5-year contract to create a recycling plant, carry out landfill remediation, and conduct waste stream characterisation.

Benefits of engaging the private sector included: the installation of weigh bridges, the construction of a new recycling plant, initial clean-up works at the New Providence landfill, and some road improvement works. However, there were some drawbacks as well. There was a breakdown in accountability and transparency, as details of Renew Bahamas’ contract were unclear to the public. Additionally, Renew Bahamas is currently trying to renegotiate its contract with the government, because its business plan, heavily reliant on revenue from recycling, appears to have been flawed. There is also weak government monitoring and initial informational gaps which inhibited accurate projections of costs and revenue. The case of Bahamas therefore demonstrates that private sector participation (PSP) in solid waste management can have benefits, but is not immune from problems.

ALEXANDRIA, EGYPT
Another example is the case of Alexandria, a city in Egypt. At the end of the 20th century, Alexandria privatised solid waste management. Complemented by a strong monitoring framework, a robust educational campaign, and strong inter-organisational relationship, solid waste services improved in effectiveness and was expanded to areas previously unserved. Remuneration for the private companies contracted to perform solid waste services also came through several sources (public and private).

1 Elements of solid waste management include: street-sweeping, waste collection, waste treatment, management of transfer station, waste disposal.
INSIGHTS FOR JAMAICA

Ultimately, privatising the NSWMA can reap benefits for Jamaica, but only if it's done right and the right foundation is laid. Indeed, as parliamentary records indicate, the NSWMA was originally conceptualised to include PSP. For PSP in solid waste management to be successful, the following six pre-requisites are necessary. (i) There must be contestability in the market. This means it should be easy for private players to participate in SWM. (ii) The government should build its capacity to design and administer contracts. (iii) There must be adequate competition in the market to help keep SWM costs low. (iv) There needs to be accurate information to improve the accuracy of projected costs and revenue, and to aid the monitoring and regulatory process. (v) There needs to be accountability and transparency in the privatisation and governance processes. (vi) The government needs to be able to effectively monitor and regulate the private sector.

Ultimately, we conclude that the NSWMA should indeed engage the private sector in some aspects of solid waste management. Our report Rethinking Solid Waste Management – Privatising the NSWMA? presents a more extensive review of the issue. It is however important to note that privatising the NSWMA will not automatically solve our SWM problems and specific measures need to be taken to ensure it works. Otherwise, incorrectly engaging the private sector can have dire consequences.

Therefore, here is a summary of our recommendations:

**ENGAGE THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT**

Waste collection and transportation, as well as landfill management, are the waste elements most urgently in need of privatisation. The NSWMA should contract out waste collection and transportation, as well as either offer concessions for or contract out the management of the Riverton and Retirement landfills. The Riverton disposal facility should also be considered for conversion to a waste-to-energy plant through private sector involvement. PSP should also be pursued for the development of recycling and composting plants.

**IMPROVE DATA COLLECTION**

The NSWMA should expand the type of data collected to include distance to landfills, fuel consumption by vehicles, topology of serviced areas, and the number of households served in each community.

**BUILD MONITORING AND REGULATORY CAPACITY**

The NSWMA should seek assistance from international agencies such as the World Bank and the United Nations Development Programme for technical advice on how to build technical capacity and effectively monitor the solid waste sector. Quarterly and annual reporting mechanisms between private companies and the NSWMA, quarterly meetings between parties, and a complementary system of penalties for contractual breaches (backed by clear performance thresholds) will help to improve the NSWMA’s monitoring capability.
These recommendations are intended to create an Integrated Sustainable Solid Waste Management (ISSWM) system that prioritises and effects what is known as the ‘hierarchy principle’ – where waste minimisation is highest priority, and the disposal of waste is a last resort, in effective solid waste management.

**COMPLETE PILOT PROJECT IN PORTMORE**

The NSWMA announced in 2015 a pilot privatisation project Portmore. The NSWMA should complete the pilot project and use the knowledge and experience gained to inform a broader privatisation process in waste collection. However, this project is not likely to offer significant insight into larger privatising initiatives such as landfill management.

**RETAIN SOME CAPACITY**

Solid waste management should not be completely privatised. The NSWMA should retain some capacity to carry out SWM activities if, for some reason, a private company leaves the market or fails to carry out its duty.

**INCENTIVISE SUSTAINABLE WASTE PRACTICES BY WASTE GENERATORS**

Policy tools such as taxes and tariffs should be used to accomplish this objective. The government should consider requiring canteens, hotels, restaurants and supermarkets to have their food waste processed (or segregated for collection) rather than simply discarded. Similarly, tax breaks/penalties should be explored for influencing businesses to separate their waste in specially labelled containers for collection and recycling.

It is however important to note that privatising the NSWMA will not automatically solve our SWM problems and specific measures need to be taken to ensure it works.
TAX COMPLIANCE IN JAMAICA: REFORMS & RECOMMENDATIONS

The functioning of any country relies heavily on its citizens paying their taxes. In Jamaica, for example, taxes comprise about 90 percent of the government’s total revenue and grants. If persons do not pay their taxes, the government will not be able to pay its bills, cover its debt, provide essential public services and carry out investment plans for the future of the country. Tax compliance can be defined as “taxpayers’ willingness to comply with tax laws, declare correct income, claim the correct deductions, relief and rebates and pay all taxes on time”. 1 While there are certain enforcement measures that tax authorities can take to ensure that taxpayers file and pay all the taxes for which they are liable, in recent years, there has been a strong emphasis on voluntary compliance.

The tax authorities in Jamaica, Tax Administration Jamaica (TAJ), recently embarked on a National Compliance Plan (NCP) in which it targets various aspects of compliance. These include registration, filing, payment, and reporting. Important to all these facets of tax compliance is the fact that citizens must be aware of the tax laws of a country in order to be able to comply with them. The challenge in most developing countries is convincing the general population that compliance is desirable and necessary. Thus, it is important to consider the effectiveness of recently implemented reforms, as well as new reforms and strategies for improving the TAJ’s future performance.

REFORMS: THE NATIONAL COMPLIANCE PLAN

Tax Administration Jamaica (TAJ) is focused on increasing its efficiency and effectiveness in an effort to improve compliance and increase revenues.

In order to accomplish this it has devised the National Compliance Plan (NCP) to be implemented between fiscal year 2014/15 and 2016/17. The new compliance model is based on encouraging voluntary compliance through service, education and enforcement.

SERVICE

Tax administration can influence the likelihood of a taxpayer being willing to voluntarily comply by adopting a service-oriented attitude toward taxpayers, educating and assisting them in meeting their obligations. 2

If persons do not pay their taxes, the government will not be able to pay its bills, cover its debt, provide essential public services and carry out investment plans for the future of the country.

Two service-oriented reforms under the NCP are as follows:

INTRODUCTION OF NEW INFORMATION MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

In February 2015 the TAJ introduced the first of three phases of a new information management system called RAiS, short for Revenue Administration Integrated System. RAiS includes both e-service and administrative components. The e-service component will allow taxpayers or their representatives to manage their accounts online. This includes accessing their filing and payment history, arranging a payment plan, applying for a refund, objecting to an assessment done, and applying for taxpayer registration numbers (TRN) and tax compliance certificates (TCC). The administrative component will allow the tax authorities to manage and track accounts that are in arrears. The third phase of the project is scheduled for September 2016, after which RAiS will be complete.

ESTABLISHMENT OF LARGE TAXPAYER OFFICE (LTO)

Jamaican tax data show that 3 percent of all taxpayers pay 80 percent of the country’s taxes (MOF, 2012). This means that Large Taxpayers’ role in tax compliance is vital. In line with international best practices, the TAJ instituted a Large Taxpayer Office (LTO) in 2009.

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The LTO was established to facilitate taxpayers who have taxable sales of more than $500 million or pay taxes exceeding $50 million per year. The facility provides a range of services specifically targeted to the large taxpayer, including assigned client relationship managers to give more personalized service.

EDUCATION
According to the Director of Communications, the TAJ has an extensive public education programme that ranges from traditional types of media such as print, television and radio to more modern social media tools such as Facebook and Twitter. They also organize town hall meetings, seminars, workshops, and monthly mobile business clinics. In addition, there are specific initiatives targeting school children to raise awareness from an early age. New developments in tax administration are sent in timely press releases to the various media houses and are automatically posted on the TAJ’s website. Under the NCP, one specific reform has been customization of education programmes.

CUSTOMIZED PROGRAMMES
The TAJ’s public education campaign makes use of taxpayer segmentation strategies, customizing communication methods to the specific type of taxpayer being targeted.

Under the National Compliance Plan, employers with 20 or more employees are supported by visits from TAJ teams, calls from the customer care centre, and reminders through the news media and the distribution of brochures.

ENFORCEMENT
As the literature on tax compliance has shown, strong enforcement mechanisms are also an important element to persuading taxpayers to comply voluntarily. In recent years, the TAJ has made some strategic changes to its enforcement mechanisms by emphasizing risk-based management by taxpayer segments and the use of alternate sources of information to make their inspection and audit programs more effective. Some specific reforms are as follows:

USE OF THIRD PARTY INFORMATION
In the 2013/2014 fiscal year, the Access to Third Party Information Act was passed. This gives the Commissioner General of the TAJ the authority to request third party information from companies, other businesses, government ministries, departments or agencies. It is anticipated that this will help the TAJ to identify delinquent companies and/or individuals who are either not paying taxes at all or who are underpaying.

REMINDER CALLS
The TAJ also has a customer call centre that facilitates both incoming and outgoing calls. Individuals and businesses are given a reminder 30 days after missing due dates. If the party remains non-compliant the case is turned over to the compliance section which follows up.

“NAME AND SHAME”
The TAJ has been known to “name and shame” delinquents in the courts. However, this enforcement measure is a last resort. Numerous reminders and warnings are usually given before such action is taken.

But just how effective have these strategies been? Have compliance levels improved? And what measures can be taken to improve tax compliance? Please download CAPRI’s report on Tax Compliance, which was published on September 26, 2016, at capricaribbean.org/publications.
LEGISLATIVE TRACKER

LAST QUARTER

SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES ACT

OBJECTIVE: Allow for the establishment of Special Economic Zones

ACTION: Pass Legislation

DEADLINE: December 31, 2015

STATUS: DELAYED, but completed in February

UP NEXT

BANK OF JAMAICA ACT

OBJECTIVE: Enhance BOJ’s governance and autonomy

ACTION: Table further amendments to the BOJ Act

DEADLINE: September 30, 2016

STATUS: DELAYED, EXPECTED completion time extended to December 2016

CUSTOMS ACT

OBJECTIVE: Enhance trade facilitation practices by the Jamaica Customs Agency

ACTION: Table Phase III of the Customs Act

DEADLINE: December 31, 2016

STATUS: DELAYED, EXPECTED completion time extended to March 2017
The Caribbean Policy Research Institute (CAPRI) is a not-for-profit, public policy think tank based at the University of the West Indies, dedicated to the provision of impartial, evidence-based knowledge to inform economic and social policy decision-making in Jamaica and the wider Caribbean.

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