


A REVIEW OF CHINESE CLIMATE ASSISTANCE IN THE CARIBBEAN

Margaret Myers, Yifang Wang, and Aleem Mahabir

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Margaret Myers is senior advisor to the Asia and Latin America Program at the Inter-American Dialogue. Yifang Wang is a program associate for the Asia and Latin America Program. Aleem Mahabir is a research fellow at the Caribbean Policy Research Institute.

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Introduction

Despite their negligible contributions to global greenhouse gas emissions, the Caribbean’s small island states have borne the brunt of climate change-related destruction, such as the unseen levels of destruction to the Bahamas brought about by Hurricane Dorian in 2019. Hurricane Beryl, the earliest recorded Category 4 storm in the region’s hurricane season, leveled 90 percent of the buildings on Grenada’s islands of Petite Martinique and Carriacou.¹ For the Caribbean region, the effects of worsening storms have amounted to massive economic disruptions and ever higher debt levels—18 percent higher than what would have been expected otherwise, according to the Inter-American Development Bank.²

Caribbean nations have been active in promoting innovative solutions to climate and debt problems, such as the US\$165 million climate-for-debt swap that Barbados negotiated in December 2024, but the region’s financial needs are only rising. According to the International Monetary Fund’s calculations, the Caribbean region will require approximately US\$100 billion in adaptation investment and finance in the coming years, equal to about one-third of its annual economic output. In addition to much-needed water and sewerage, agricultural, transport infrastructure and other upgrades, there is considerable demand for investment in lower-cost and lower-carbon energy production.³

This report offers an assessment of the depth, breadth, and comparative nature of China’s direct climate cooperation with the Caribbean from 2013 to 2023.

With all of this in mind, the region is unsurprisingly at the forefront of global calls for climate action and partnership. Caribbean nations have developed a relatively robust institutional framework for climate action, including the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC), the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency

(CDEMA), and the Caribbean Institute for Meteorology and Hydrology (CIMH), among others. These institutions, guided by CARICOM’s Updated Regional Frameworks for Environment and Natural Resources and Climate Resilience (2019–2029), provide a foundation for coordinating and aligning external assistance with Caribbean resilience priorities. Even as the United States defunds much of its climate programming, coordination continues with other partners. Canada announced just over US\$127 million in 2024 for three projects that will help increase climate resilience and address other development challenges.⁴ Japan is also active in this space. And, as part of Euroclima, the European Union (EU) has introduced programming to build resilience in the region.

As documented in this paper, China’s presence is also growing at a steady pace, both in economic terms and on climate and other issues of interest to the region, such as disaster relief, energy transition, and food security, as part of its stated commitment to partnership with the Global South. As traditional partners recalibrate their foreign assistance strategies, China’s growing involvement in climate and development initiatives across the Caribbean reflects broader shifts in the geopolitical and financial landscape of international climate cooperation.

Amid likely debate on future U.S. assistance to the Caribbean, and efforts to leverage other partnerships in support of urgent needs, Caribbean decision-makers will benefit from a clear understanding of the extent and nature of climate assistance by Chinese and other partners—especially amid regional efforts to evaluate, coordinate, and leverage this assistance within the region’s existing policy frameworks and institutional landscape.

To that end, this report offers an assessment of the depth, breadth, and comparative nature of China’s direct climate cooperation with the Caribbean from 2013 to 2023. It aims to reconcile Chinese climate diplomacy and messaging in the Caribbean with accounts of China’s on the ground climate assistance to the region, while also examining the main forms and features of Chinese climate assistance across much of the Caribbean and their degree of alignment with the region’s own climate priorities.

China's Approach to Climate Cooperation with the Caribbean: Four Observations

1. Climate diplomacy is an increasingly central feature of Chinese engagement with the Caribbean.

Much attention has been paid to China's ambitious domestic climate agenda, including the April 2025 announcement that China would set new goals to cut emissions by 2035, "covering the entire economy, including all greenhouse gases," instead of carbon dioxide alone, ahead of the 30th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP30) summit in November.⁵ China would seem committed to these and other efforts, "no matter how the international situation changes," as Chinese President Xi Jinping noted during the same announcement, adding that "China will not slow down its efforts to address climate change."⁶ Indeed, China is making notable progress toward its climate goals, even as it faces enduring challenges reducing carbon intensity and fully aligning with the objectives of the Paris Agreement.

Beyond its domestic objectives, China has also increasingly prioritized climate-based partnership-building across the Global South, and an accompanying campaign to communicate its commitment to addressing developing country climate concerns. Of China's many activities in the region, the development of multilateral platforms and frameworks for climate communication and cooperation remains a focus of Chinese officials, whether in the Caribbean or other regions. These include the United Nations High-Level Forum of South-South Cooperation in Climate Change, to which China pledged US\$2 billion a year in 2014 in support for climate cooperation;⁷ the US\$ 2 billion "Ten-Hundred-Thousand" Program for South-South Cooperation on Climate Change, which was proposed in 2015; the 2019 Belt and Road South-South Cooperation Initiative on Climate Change; and the 2021 Global Development Initiative (GDI), which emphasizes climate change and green development, among other work.⁸ The newest iteration of the China-CELAC (Community of Latin American and Caribbean States) Forum common action

plan, which was adopted on May 2025, also includes a section on climate change, which encourages cooperation on the China-developed International Zero-Carbon Island Initiatives,⁹ as well a joint research on climate resilience.¹⁰

Communication of these efforts is another central feature of China's climate diplomacy, carried out through embassy communications, high-level speeches, and engagements with regional leadership. Through multiple channels and platforms, mostly targeting audiences across the Global South, and especially small island developing states, China has advanced distinct narratives about its climate actions and interests, underscoring its interest in "participating in and leading international cooperation on the climate change agenda," as noted in the country's 14th Five-Year Plan.

Examples of China's climate-related messaging are abundant in the Caribbean region. Climate featured prominently in the authors' review of the 3,723 op-eds published in Caribbean media outlets by Chinese ambassadors between 2019 and 2023. Word frequency analysis revealed that 31 percent of these ambassadorial communications included reference to the terms climate, climate change, sustainability, clean and green transition, and/or disaster alleviation. Many also expressed solidarity with local governments while also referencing the plight of island nations (see Figure 1 for examples). Additionally, climate-related communications were most evident in smaller, tourism dependent economies, such as the Bahamas and Grenada, and also in Barbados, where Prime

China's leadership has increasingly prioritized climate-based partnership-building across the Global South, and an expansive, related campaign to communicate China's commitment to addressing developing country climate concerns.

FIGURE 1. EXAMPLES OF CLIMATE-FOCUSED OP-EDS BY CHINESE AMBASSADORS IN CARIBBEAN MEDIA, 2020–2024

Source: Author Compilations; Chinese embassy websites.

YEAR	COUNTRY	AUTHOR	TITLE
2020	Dominica	Lu Kun	China Actively Participates in Global Climate Governance ⁵⁹
2021	Jamaica	Tian Qi	Working Together to Tackle Climate Change ⁶⁰
2021	Antigua and Barbuda	Wang Erdong	Unite for Action to Jointly Tackle Climate Change ⁶¹
2021	Trinidad and Tobago	Fang Qiu	Building a Community of Life for Man and Nature ⁶²
2021	Suriname	Han Jing	Promoting Global Development Initiatives and Working Together to Build a Better Future ⁶³
2024	Guyana	Guo Haiyan	Development of China's New Energy Industry and Cooperation Opportunities with Guyana ⁶⁴

Minister Mia Mottley has been a prominent global advocate for Caribbean climate assistance.


Through op-eds and other communications with the Caribbean, such as speeches at small island states forums, China also frequently compares its climate-related engagements with those of other countries, positioning itself as an ally of developing nations while noting that the United States and other rich developed countries are making unfair demands in the context of an international order that upholds developing country interests.¹¹ In 2024, at the Small Island Developing States Forum in Antigua and Barbuda, China's Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu called for "reform of the unjust and unreasonable political and economic order."¹² Additionally, and although China has been the world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases since 2006, these communications have occasionally positioned China alongside lower emitting countries in the Global South, noting that China's citizens live less luxurious lifestyles, on average, than those in the United States or certain European countries.¹³

In the Caribbean, the centrality of climate in China's diplomatic messaging and outreach is ostensibly aimed at forging stronger diplomatic ties to Caribbean nations, where climate change and its implications are generally top of mind. Although the Caribbean is not a top foreign policy priority for China, ties to the region achieve a range of political and economic aims. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) alone represents 14 votes in international institutions and the region is home to five of Taiwan's remaining twelve diplomatic partners. Proximity to the United States has also arguably driven some of China's economic and strategic engagement with the region, as has interest in Caribbean tourism, natural resources, and export markets. Additionally, the region is one of a few key transit zones for China as it transports raw materials from Latin America.

Chinese engagement, whether on climate or other matters, is also likely intended to demonstrate the value of partnership with China, including to those Caribbean and other countries that maintain diplomatic ties to Taiwan, which China has sought to erode.

FIGURE 2. CHINESE AMBASSADOR COMMUNIQUEES REFERENCING CLIMATE, BY CARIBBEAN COUNTRY, 2019–2023 (AS % OF TOTAL AMBASSADORIAL COMMUNICATIONS)

Sources: Chinese Embassy websites and Author Calculations; see Methodology Note.



The view of climate diplomacy as a central feature of China's broader foreign policy, whether in the Caribbean or other regions, is thought to have been further elevated by the 2024 appointment of professional diplomat Liu Zhenmin as China's special envoy for climate change. According to Asia Society Policy Institute Senior Fellow Guoguang Wu, the appointment of Liu suggests that China prioritizes climate diplomacy as part of its foreign policy agenda, possibly over substantive climate action.¹⁴

Beyond the Narrative

Of great interest at this juncture is the extent to which China's emphasis on climate diplomacy in the Caribbean and other regions is translating to concrete, effective, and expanded action on climate-related matters. On the one hand, China's plans and promises over the past

decade have seemingly prompted more overseas climate outreach and programming, whether bilaterally or through international organizations and multilateral development banks. China spent over US\$1 billion a year on average on climate-related projects in the Global South between 2013 and 2017, according to climate change think tank E3G's estimates.

At the same time, the activities associated with China's multiple climate cooperation platforms are not clearly documented, and funds have reportedly been slow to materialize in certain cases. For example, in 2022, China's National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation, a think tank of the Ministry of Ecology and Environments (MoEE), noted that the Ten-Hundred-Thousand project had yet to reach its established goals. The program's intended funding source, the China Climate Change South-South Cooperation Fund (SSCCF),

has yet to be established “due to lack of coordination and other factors,”¹⁵ so that MoEE’s execution of Ten-Hundred-Thousand project relied on a departmental foreign aid budget regulated by the Ministry of Finance (MoF), limiting its ability to carry out more extensive outreach.¹⁶

China’s public accounting of its climate activities is also vague and heavily reliant on aggregate counts of global or regional climate-related activities. For example, Vice Foreign Minister Ma Zhaoxu’s speech at the Fourth International Conference on Small Island Developing States, noted that “[China has] set up and implemented nearly 200 cooperation projects for small island states, covering trade and investment, infrastructure, healthcare and other areas.”¹⁷

China has engaged in numerous activities in the region—economic, political, and otherwise—that are later upheld as climate-related, given their tangential contributions to energy transition.

Counts of Chinese climate-related engagements similarly feature in Chinese ministerial reports [by the Ministry of Commerce (MofCOM), MoEE, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA), for instance], in reporting by China’s International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA), the country’s foreign aid and international development agency; and in government white papers, but without identifying referenced projects. For instance, according to MoEE’s “State of the Ecology and Environment in China 2023” report, released in November 2024, “China has signed 52 South-South cooperation documents on climate change with 42 developing countries,” and “cumulatively implemented more than 300 capacity-building projects, providing more than 10,000 training posts to more than 120 developing countries; implemented 12 workshops on technology transfer and climate information services for

developing countries to address climate change under China’s Global Development Initiative.”¹⁸

In general, little detail is provided by Chinese officials or in Chinese ministry reporting on the nature of the projects cited or their outcomes. Nor is it clear whether these activities are explicitly climate related. In fact, in many cases, China’s examples of climate cooperation, though likely contributive to a range of Chinese and local objectives, would seem the byproduct of other forms of higher-priority outreach, as noted by participants in a October 2024 roundtable on the topic, held by CAPRI, the Inter-American Dialogue, and the U.S. Institute of Peace. China has engaged in numerous activities in the region—economic, political, and otherwise—that are later upheld as climate-related, given their tangential contributions to energy transition, food security (such as Zhejiang province’s 2023 donation of agricultural equipment and materials to Grenada), resilience, or any other number of climate-adjacent objectives. For example, because it features solar panels and electric vehicle (EV) charging stations in the project, China’s grant to reconstruct the Barbados National Stadium is upheld by Chinese officials as contributing to the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.¹⁹

2. China’s approach to climate assistance in the Caribbean is distinct from that of other partner nations in several notable ways.

Beyond their counts of climate engagements by region, Chinese ministries do not maintain publicly available records of direct overseas climate assistance, whether in the Caribbean or other regions. In pursuit of a more detailed account of China’s climate assistance to the region, the authors set out to estimate the extent of Chinese climate activity through a systematic review of Chinese and Caribbean media, Chinese embassy and Ministry of Foreign Affairs communications, and information accessible through publicly available data sets, including AidData’s and the Inter-American Dialogue’s accounting of Chinese finance and foreign direct investment in the region, respectively.

The observations made in this section are based on data compiled by the authors on China’s direct climate engagement from 2013 to 2023 with the 15 nations that comprise CARICOM,²⁰ including those that maintain ties to

Taiwan, as well as Cuba, Haiti, and the Dominican Republic. We have also relied on individual interviews with Caribbean climate experts, as well as key takeaways from the previously-referenced April 2024 roundtable event.

In the absence of a standard Chinese definition of its overseas climate cooperation, the authors consider China's climate cooperation/outreach in the Caribbean to include the direct provision of financing (including export credits), donations, technical cooperation, educational outreach, and foreign direct investment (including infrastructure development that China describes as climate-related), whether in support of disaster relief, energy transition, food security, or other forms of climate-related recovery or resilience. Although the delivery of low-cost, high-tech inputs is supportive of climate objectives in some parts of the Caribbean, we do not include bilateral trade as a form of climate assistance, unless conducted as part of a grant, loan, or investment project. By the same token, Chinese company construction contracts are excluded unless part of a broader Chinese government financing arrangement.

By including instances of Chinese foreign direct investment, including in infrastructure with sometimes tenuous connections to regional climate goals, we risk overcounting or overrepresenting China's climate


assistance to the region. However, we have aimed to include as many examples of climate cooperation in our data as possible, while also recognizing Chinese views of infrastructure development as part of a comprehensive climate planning, and a form of climate outreach "with Chinese characteristics."

Based on this definition, we found that China carried out at least 139 direct, climate-related projects in 13 Caribbean countries over the past decade, with an overwhelming focus on Cuba and Dominica—the destinations for 29 percent (40 projects) and 14 percent (19 projects), respectively, of China's total direct climate cooperation in the region. The total dollar value of these contributions is difficult to calculate given the lack of public information and reporting on many of these activities, but the 65 percent of projects in our data set that contain a dollar value totaled approximately US\$4 billion, as calculated using the exchange rate on the day of project's announcement.

These projects have ranged from multi-million-dollar credits for the purchase of Chinese equipment—such as for the construction of the 20MW Jesus Rabi Biomass Power Plant in Cuba—to various forms of technical and educational outreach, including a 2018 training for twenty

FIGURE 3: INSTANCES OF CHINESE DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE, 2013–2023

Source: Author Calculations; see Methodology Note.



Jamaican students on water supply and wastewater treatment technology. Disaster relief donations are another common category of assistance. These include a US\$30million pledge to CARICOM to assist post-hurricane recovery in 2017, which has yet to materialize, according to publicly available sources; US\$7.5 million donated to Jamaica after Hurricane Beryl; and the donation of 40 fire trucks to the Dominican Republic.²¹ Other forms of outreach are far smaller in scale, such as the donation of food baskets by the Chinese government to Trinidad and Tobago in 2021.

While many of China's climate-related projects fall under the CIDCA domains of energy, agriculture, and disaster resilience, it is not entirely clear how or whether these projects align with the Caribbean's own stated priorities.

In some ways, China's assistance is quite similar to that of other donors. If categorized according to the ten domains for overseas assistance—education, health, culture, public management, transportation, energy, communications, agriculture, environmental protection, and humanitarian affairs—put forth by CIDCA, it would appear that most of China's climate-related assistance in the Caribbean falls under the energy, agriculture, environmental protection, and humanitarian domains (see Figure 4 for examples of projects by domain), often in the form of donations, which represent 64 percent of total Chinese cooperation, according to our definition. Trainings in these areas account for another 13 percent of activity. Other donor nation activities tend to fall heavily in these domains, although domain definitions vary across countries. These are areas where many Caribbean partners have been active over the years.

Although many of China's climate-related projects fall under the CIDCA domains of energy, agriculture, and disaster resilience, it is not entirely clear to what extent they align with the Caribbean's own stated priorities. For instance, CARICOM's Implementation Plan for the Regional Framework (2011–2021) identifies ecosystem-based adaptation, early warning systems, and institutional strengthening as core adaptation measures. However, Chinese climate cooperation has generally placed greater emphasis on hard infrastructure and technology transfer, with fewer relative investments in ecosystem management or national adaptation planning processes. A clearer alignment between Chinese assistance and regional priority areas, particularly in underfunded domains such as integrated water resource management or coastal zone protection—could enhance the effectiveness future cooperation.

As with other donors, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) assistance features as part of China's direct climate assistance profile in the Caribbean, as noted in Figure 3, but in a far less coordinated fashion than the HA/DR traditionally provided by the United States and other nearby partners. China has provided sizeable contributions in certain cases, especially following large storms, but this assistance has been sporadic, and donations can range from the US\$7 million donated to Jamaica following Hurricane Beryl in November 2024 to much smaller contributions, such as the delivery by the Chinese embassy of first aid kits, safety vests, helmets, ponchos, and headlights to the Bahamas in 2021. The United States has historically maintained a comparatively robust bureaucratic infrastructure, ready to deliver aid to the Caribbean via humanitarian missions coordinated by the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and civilian Disaster Assistance Response Teams (DART), which were deployed in Haiti after the 2021 hurricane and earthquakes, for instance. Prior to its dissolution, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) supported the US\$100 million CARICOM Resilience Fund, which sought to mitigate the financial shocks of extreme weather events.²²

Also, like other major donors in the Caribbean, China is active in the provision of indirect assistance through the climate funds of multilateral institutions, although this form of assistance is not included in our data set. According to the World Resources Institute, 34 percent of China's global climate finance, in the amount of approximately US\$45 billion, was channeled through multilateral public funds from 2013 to 2022.²³ Trade in green energy and other technologies is also increasingly viewed by China as a contribution to climate and related

FIGURE 4. EXAMPLES OF CHINESE CLIMATE ASSISTANCE IN THE CARIBBEAN BY CIDCA DOMAIN

Source: Author compilation; see Methodology Note.

CIDCA DOMAIN	COUNTRY	YEAR	NAME
Energy	Cuba	2017	CUP 12 million (US\$0.45 million) loan to EDIFRE for 40 Solar Farms Project (CN035)
Energy	Cuba	2017	US\$81.5 million and US\$78.2 million buyer's credits for 51MW La Herradura Phase I and 50MW La Herradura Phase II Wind Farm Project (CN043, CN044)
Energy	Dominican Republic	2018	RMB 4.2 billion (US\$605 million) loan for Medium and Low Voltage Electricity Network Improvement Project (CN102)
Energy	Dominican Republic	2018	US\$50M for construction of Manzanillo Bay Natural Gas Power Plant (CN103)
Energy	Guyana	2021	Training course on the application of photovoltaic power generation, hosted by the China Electricity Construction Group Zhongnan Survey and Design Research Institute Co. (CN129)
Agriculture	Antigua and Barbuda	2018	XCD 8 million (US\$2.96 million) grant for agricultural technical cooperation project (CN002)
Agriculture	Barbados	2017	RMB 50 million (US\$7.79 million) for agricultural projects (CN022)
Agriculture	Cuba	2015	Fruit and vegetable processing plant project with Grupo Empresarial de la Industria Alimentaria (CN058)
Agriculture	Grenada	2022	Training course on pest control for tropical crops, hosted by China's Ministry of Commerce (CN110)
Agriculture	Guyana	2022	Training course on net-pen fish farming in Guyana, hosted by the China-Caribbean Development Center (CN128)
Environmental Protection	Antigua and Barbuda	2019	RMB 80 million (US\$11.38 million) grant (via ETCA) for Affordable Climate Resilient Housing Project (CN001)
Environmental Protection	Cuba	2023	Drought response and sewerage system improvement equipment (CN031)

Environmental Protection	Dominica	2018	US\$15 million to assist with construction of new climate smart schools (CN078)
Environmental Protection	Jamaica	2018	Training for 20 students in water supply and wastewater treatment technology (CN139)
Environmental Protection	Cuba	2014	Environmental monitoring equipment donation (CN060)
Humanitarian	Bahamas	2021	Disaster relief supplies donation to NEMA (CN008)
Humanitarian	Cuba	2023	Emergency cash assistance from Red Cross Society of China following heavy rainfall (CN030)
Humanitarian	Grenada	2023	Disaster prevention and mitigation grant (CN107)
Humanitarian	Trinidad and Tobago	2021	Food basked donation during pandemic (CN155)
Humanitarian	Regional	2017	US\$30 million grant to CARICOM for recovery efforts in nations affected by Hurricanes Irma and Maria (CN158)

objectives, whether in the Caribbean or other parts of the world.

In other ways, China's approach is quite different from that of the Caribbean's other climate partners. For instance, a substantial portion of China's climate assistance is focused on infrastructure development or related equipment provision. By our count, approximately 30 percent (42 projects) of Chinese climate assistance is focused on new energy-equipped infrastructure development or post-disaster reconstruction. This count includes some construction projects financed by Chinese policy banks (China Development Bank and China Export-Import Bank) or Chinese commercial banks (e.g., ICBC, Bank of China). Climate think tank E3G similarly found that of a documented 45 international agreements between China and 38 countries on climate mitigation and adaptation carried out between 2011 and 2024, a considerable portion were focused on small-scale

infrastructure development (e.g., small solar and high-tech equipment donations (energy efficient lighting and electric buses)).²⁴

Examples of China's infrastructure-related assistance include US\$37 million²⁵ and US\$11 million Chinese government grants²⁶ to Antigua and Barbuda in 2018 for affordable housing projects featuring climate-resilient designs. In Dominica, China issued a US\$19 million grant for the West Coast Road Rehabilitation Project in 2017 after Hurricane Erika.²⁷ More recent projects include the new Barbados National Stadium announced in 2022,²⁸ which features some solar panels and EV charging stations, and the 2021 post-Maria construction of Six Schools in Dominica, which were described by China as a contribution to Dominica's climate resilience, having been built in the aftermath of a natural disaster.²⁹ Chinese finance for construction and materials acquisition also features among these examples, such as the 2013

suppliers credit from China Harbor Engineering to Grenada for the purchase of flood mitigation equipment and materials.³⁰

Finally, capacity-building initiatives, which have been a focus for other partners to the Caribbean, are not a particularly prominent feature of Chinese climate assistance in the Caribbean. Canada, Europe, Japan, and the United States have historically focused on climate related capacity building through capacity-building grant-making—aiming to equip governments or local civil society organizations to carry out projects on their own, or in coordination with institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, Inter-American Development Bank, World Bank, or the CARICOM system.

In practice, these projects are not nearly as visible as infrastructure, big ticket donations, or other, more tangible forms of assistance. As a former USAID representative noted during our 2024 roundtable event, the results of many U.S.-funded projects haven't "lent themselves to photo opportunities." One example is a flooding prevention project in Barbados that was carried out with U.S. support, but which mostly consisted of ditch construction.³¹ The

project dramatically reduced the flooding of roadways during heavy rains, but the benefits, as the participant noted, were harder to convey to the general public than those of schools or other, highly-visible infrastructure projects supported by China and certain other donors.

China's climate cooperation is similarly carried out by a wide cast of characters—beyond those responsible for formulating China's domestic and international priorities and strategies. Chinese embassies, non-governmental organizations (e.g., the Chinese Red Cross), quasi-governmental organizations, Chinese Communist Party organs, companies, banks, and other entities all feature in our counts of Chinese climate cooperation within the Caribbean.

In this sense, there are notable similarities between China's examples of climate cooperation in the Caribbean and its efforts to deliver Covid-19 assistance in the Latin American and Caribbean region in 2020 and 2021. China's approach to Covid-19 diplomacy was best characterized as semi-coordinated—employing numerous Chinese actors to deploy assistance in support of commercial, political, and public relations objectives, while also affording them

FIGURE 5: TOTAL CHINESE GREEN TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS TO CARICOM, CUBA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, AND HAITI, 2015-2024 (USD BILLIONS)

Source: Author Calculations using China Customs data.





FIGURE 6. TOTAL CHINESE GREEN TECHNOLOGY EXPORTS BY COUNTRY/TERRITORY, 2015-2024 (USD BILLIONS)

Source: Author Calculations using China Customs data.



a degree of autonomy in their outreach. This decentralized process, refereed by Chinese embassies, provided China with considerable flexibility and, especially, visibility when operating in the region. The sheer number of contact points generated by this strategy ensured substantial media coverage and recognition of China's efforts.³²

Unlike many of the Caribbean's other international partners, China has also resolutely upheld the exportation of low-cost green technology and equipment, and related market-seeking investment, as a primary component of its direct climate assistance. In May 2024, at the Small Island Developing States Forum in Antigua and Barbuda, Chinese climate envoy Ma Zhaoxu emphasized China's commitment

to bringing new technology to the Caribbean, noting that "innovation is the primary driving force for development," and asserting that "small island countries must not be left behind" in the new round of scientific and technological revolution and industrial transformation.³³ China has advocated for the sharing of experience, technology, talent, and resources, to "chart a path to a green, low-carbon transition that features complementary strengths and mutual benefits," as the MoEE-affiliated BRI International Green Development Coalition (BRIGC) described it, while heralding China's work to curb emissions at home.³⁴

More recently, the 2024 Joint Statement of the Ministerial Conference of the Fourth China-Caribbean Economic and

Trade Cooperation Forum promoted mutual investment between enterprises from both sides in areas such as food production, green development, blue economy, and renewable energy.³⁵ This report does not consider direct exports in its accounts of Chinese climate assistance, but certain investments and other projects, such as 51MW La Herradura Phase I Wind Farm in Cuba or the donation of BYD electric buses to Barbados, which actively promote the exportation of Chinese tech and equipment, do feature in our data set.

China's exportation of solar, wind, battery and other technologies has been mostly welcomed by the region and embraced by Caribbean leadership as a form of climate assistance. In 2023, Guyana's president Irfaan Ali noted that China "...can accelerate the pace of investment in green energy suppliers, such as hydropower, solar power, and wind power."³⁶ In a 2021 call with Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister Keith Rowley, Xi Jinping assured Rowley that "China is willing to actively expand cooperation in areas such as new energy, digital economy,

and connectivity, to push the China-Trinidad & Tobago comprehensive partnership to a new level."³⁷

Of course, China's exports to the Caribbean and other parts of the Global South are also the result of Beijing's ongoing efforts to boost industrial productivity and competitiveness. China's subsidies and other interventions have led to overcapacity in wind turbines, solar power panels and systems, and electric vehicles manufacturing, among other high-tech items. As a result, since 2015, Chinese manufacturers grew from supplying around 3.5 percent of global wind exports to 20 percent in 2022.³⁸ According to the Financial Times, an explosion in Chinese solar manufacturing capacity in 2022 and 2023—from about 198GW to more than 1 terawatt in two years—has led to steep price reductions and fueled a surge in Chinese solar module exports and allegations of dumping.³⁹ Chinese EV sales have similarly skyrocketed (see Figure 5). In aggregate, at least, the Caribbean region represents a notable, though not entirely critical, destination for Chinese high-tech goods and services. Exports of renewable energy

FIGURE 7. CIDCA DOMAINS WITH CLIMATE AND ENVIRONMENTAL APPLICATIONS

Source: Author compilation using CIDCA website.⁶⁵

DOMAIN	EXPLANATION	PARAMETERS
6. Energy	"Energy is an essential material foundation for the survival and development of human society, and the transition to clean energy is also a key measure to mitigate and address climate change. China's energy sector assistance focuses on helping recipient countries improve energy accessibility and transition capabilities. It mainly includes energy infrastructure, energy-related supplies, capacity building in the energy sector, planning, and joint exploration projects."	6.1 Increase power supply, reduce costs and energy consumption 6.2 Enhance economic benefits 6.3 Improve energy access 6.4 Optimize energy structure and reduce emissions 6.5 Promote related research and governance
8. Agriculture	"Agriculture is the foundation of a nation and the cornerstone of national strength, serving as the bedrock for economic and social development. China has consistently prioritized agriculture as a key area in its foreign aid efforts, implementing various assistance projects to help developing countries improve their full-chain capabilities from production to sales. Specific initiatives include building farms, agricultural technology demonstration centers, agricultural technology testing and extension stations, constructing farmland water conservancy projects, providing agricultural supplies, dispatching agricultural technicians and experts, offering agricultural consultancy, and training agricultural talent."	8.1 Promote agricultural production 8.2 Advance agricultural technology 8.3 Support agricultural processing industries

9. Environmental Protection	"Ecological and environmental protection is an integral part of sustainable development. China's foreign aid in the field of environmental protection adheres to the philosophy that 'clear waters and green mountains are as valuable as mountains of gold and silver,' embodying the dual goals of protecting the environment and promoting the development of recipient countries. Relevant aid projects mainly include providing supplies for forest and wildlife protection, conducting human resource training, implementing environmental protection technology demonstration projects, building infrastructure for ecological and environmental research institutions, and supporting these efforts with research."	9.1 Support biodiversity and nature conservation 9.2 Address pollution 9.3 Mitigate climate change impacts 9.4 Promote related research and governance
10. Humanitarian	"With the intensification of global humanitarian crises, humanitarian aid has become a key area of international foreign aid efforts. China adheres to the principles of respecting and protecting life and reducing and resolving crises through development, providing as much assistance as possible to disaster-affected areas. China's humanitarian aid covers emergency rescue for natural disasters, emergency food assistance, responses to public health emergencies, and participation in alleviating migration and refugee crises. Aid methods include providing supplies, dispatching rescue teams, and medical teams."	10.1 Respond to humanitarian emergencies 10.2 Improve disaster relief capacity 10.3 Support post-disaster reconstruction

equipment to the Caribbean grew by 571 percent between 2020 (US\$49 million) and 2024 (US\$280 million).⁴⁰ Lithium battery and new energy vehicles are among the highest growing exports, which from 2020 to 2024 grew by 626 percent and 1103 percent, respectively. To date, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, Puerto Rico, and Jamaica have been the largest importers of Chinese batteries, electric vehicles, and solar and wind infrastructure (see Figure 6).

3. China has employed a "transactional and ad hoc" approach to climate assistance.

Participants in our October 2024 roundtable meeting described Chinese climate and other assistance in the Caribbean as both transactional and ad hoc. Specifically, they noted that in practice, many of China's climate-related activities in the Caribbean have originated not as part of an overarching climate strategy for the region, but in consultation with or at the behest of host country leadership.⁴¹

Chinese processes and procedures would appear to support this model. According to the Interim Measures for the Management of the South-South Cooperation Material Assistance Project on Addressing Climate Change, "[a]pplications for material assistance projects under South-South cooperation are generally submitted by the relevant foreign authorities to the Ministry of Ecology and Environment through Chinese embassies or consulates abroad, with copies sent to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the China International Development Cooperation Agency."⁴² A similar system would appear to be used for projects that are funded by China's established climate funds and platforms. According to the Embassy of Grenada's announcement of China's Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund, "Grenada is encouraged to actively participate in the fund, either through the Chinese embassy or through direct engagement with CIDCA."⁴³

This rather ad hoc and partner-driven approach to climate cooperation differs in notable ways from the more concrete, donor-generated, and climate-specific strategies put forth by the United States in years past, as well as the efforts of other donors, which have sought to clearly

define their respective approaches to climate cooperation and implemented their own, corresponding Caribbean initiatives. These include the Japan Caribbean Climate Change Partnership and Euroclima. These differences between Chinese and other donor approaches were observed and critiqued by the MoEE in a journal article published by its policy center in 2020, which concluded that China's climate cooperation in the Caribbean and the South Pacific was "still in the exploratory stage, with an insufficient understanding of the cooperation needs and a lack of comprehensive and systematic planning and strategy," whereas, at the time at least, the United States had "established regulations, defined clear objectives, and conducted top-level design."⁴⁴

Based on these and other observations, some Chinese institutions, such as the China Council for International Cooperation on the Environment and Development (CCICED), have advocated for a more coordinated approach to overseas climate and resilience cooperation, rather than one that relies heavily on host country initiatives or or simply supporting on mere support the efforts of existing United Nations bodies responsible for climate action and monitoring, as proposed in China's most recent Policy Paper on Latin America and the Caribbean, published in 2016.⁴⁵

However, so far, Chinese institutions have yet to publish an overarching climate policy for the Caribbean or other parts of the world, aside from the broad references to climate diplomacy and activity laid out in "China's Policies and Actions for Addressing Climate Change," which is published annually by the MoEE. Explicit reference to climate is also absent from CIDCA's ten domains and institutional strategy (see Figure 7), even though CIDCA's priority areas of focus, including agriculture and energy, naturally intersect with climate objectives, and even though CIDCA has signed memorandums of understanding with other institutions to advance United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which include some climate-related aims.⁴⁶

To date, in the Western Hemisphere, the China-CELAC Joint Action Plan for Cooperation in Key Areas (2022-2024)⁴⁷ is the closest thing to a Chinese climate action plan for the Caribbean, with a sizeable section of the document dedicated to climate and other environmental cooperation, calling for exchanges and training in areas such as integrated water resources management, flood and drought disaster risk prevention, land erosion remediation, forest protection, bamboo cultivation and utilization, emergency

management, disaster prevention, among other climate and sustainability-related areas.

Chinese scholars have also noted a lack of coherent and cross-cutting strategy for climate policy implementation at home, even as China's leadership sets clear and ambitious national climate objectives. While the Chinese government has made measurable progress on mitigation, according to Qi, et. al.,⁴⁸ "most climate risk management measures taken by the government are sectoral measures, and there is a lack of a comprehensive, systematic, and integrated thinking to guide climate risk management." The authors go on to recommend a holistic, cross-department approach to climate security. An assessment by Chao, et. al.,⁴⁹ also recommends improved intersectoral coordination at the domestic level to ensure that climate change measures contribute effectively to China's national socio-economic development strategies.

The urgency of the climate crisis has and will continue to justify Caribbean partnership with China in many forms.

China's efforts at home and abroad may very well be hampered by the large number of institutions currently responsible for executing climate goals. For instance, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs helps shape China's climate diplomacy, while also carrying out the widespread climate messaging campaigns described in the previous section. China's policy banks issue credit to Caribbean and other nations, but with a mix of Chinese and foreign country objectives in mind, which may or may not be climate-related, as SEAF's Gerard Johnson noted during our 2024 roundtable, and not always in coordination with the MoFA, MoEE, or other relevant institutions within the Chinese government.⁵⁰

4. *There are natural limits to China's climate cooperation with the Caribbean.*

There are several potential benefits to China's brand of climate cooperation with the Caribbean. For one thing, the ad hoc and transactional nature of Chinese assistance implies a degree of responsiveness to local needs, even if much of what China is pursuing doesn't fully align with regional climate priorities.

Also, China's climate-related investments and other forms of assistance are often executed with so-called "China speed." China has been relatively quick to issue donations when requested, for instance—often following a storm, drought, or other disaster. Also, as previously noted, China has sought to engage where other donors are not, possibly filling gaps in overall donor contributions. This is notable at a moment when the United States appears to be withdrawing critical forms of climate assistance, though it is unclear whether China is inclined to step into the fold in those areas where the United States was deeply focused.

In practice, some Caribbean countries will be more receptive than others to China's climate-related activities and messaging.

At the same time, as previously noted, China has seemingly preferred short-term, ad hoc engagements, over long-term, climate- and resilience-focused activities, such as the long-term capacity building efforts historically promoted by the United States and other donors. And, while Chinese investment and assistance, whether climate-related or otherwise, is welcomed by most in the region, it is unclear to what extent China's measures and methods will have enduring effects on regional resilience. China's lack of public mechanisms for measuring the social, environmental, and broad sustainability impact of Chinese donations and projects, leaves both Chinese experts and Caribbean nations without the data necessary to measure project success or ensure accountability.⁵¹

The effects of problematic Chinese investments have also resonated among the populations in certain parts of the region, affecting both Chinese and Caribbean perceptions of project risk. Jamaica has seen protests over anomalies in wages and employment of Chinese workers.⁵² Chinese firms have also been accused of pay discrepancies, dangerous working conditions, and firing of Jamaican workers seeking union representation.⁵³ Furthermore, an October 2024 ruling found China Construction America—a unit of China State Construction Engineering Corporation—guilty of corruption and fraud concerning the Baha Mar resort in the Bahamas, imposing a US\$1.6 billion penalty, pending appeal.⁵⁴ Although the region remains committed to strong partnerships with China and welcoming of investment, it does so with a seemingly greater degree of caution than in the past. Of course, at the same time, as the University of Delaware's Kalim Shah and Erica Chiorazzi have noted, the urgency of the climate crisis has and will continue to justify partnership with China in many forms.⁵⁵

It should also be noted that in some Caribbean countries, as elsewhere, China remains heavily involved in sectors with outsize environmental impact, such as the extractive industry and large-scale infrastructure. Latin American NGOs and environmental groups, including those from the Caribbean, have voiced their concern over concessions for Chinese projects that pose risks to endangered species, marine protected areas, and other protected ecosystems, arguing that Chinese investors do not make sufficient investments to avoid negative environmental impacts—a record that stands in stark contrast to the climate-friendly image that China has sought to portray to the region.⁵⁶

In practice, some Caribbean countries are more receptive than others to China's climate outreach—to include finance, investment, donations, and disaster relief—and its related messaging. To date, China's climate-related engagement and broader economic activity are not evenly distributed across the region. Based on our data, China's climate assistance is overwhelmingly focused on Cuba and the Dominican Republic, despite climate concerns across the region. Additionally, there are those Caribbean economies that are largely service based (relying on tourism and financial services) and those that are heavily engaged in mining (of bauxite, oil and gas, for instance). The latter are uniquely acquainted with China's enduring interest in extractive sector investment, and will no doubt view China and its climate commitments differently than the former, as our 2024 roundtable participants noted.

Finally, the policies put forth by the Caribbean's other foreign partners have and may continue to limit certain

forms of Chinese climate assistance, especially the exportation of new energy and other technologies. As the Caribbean region looks to advance plans for new energy acquisition and implementation, market distortions from non-tariff barriers have raised the costs for local firms that access development finance from multilateral development banks or Western bilateral programs. Bans on Chinese technologies imposed by North American and European governments are another complicating factor, and have been inconsistent between countries and within them. For instance, the bans upheld by the U.S. Treasury within multilateral development banks are often more rigorous than those applied by the U.S. Development Finance Corporation, according to Gerard Johnson. Greater consistency in the formulation and implementation of restrictions will ensure the Caribbean is better able to navigate this rapidly shifting landscape.

Conclusions

Looking ahead, climate assistance in its various forms, and from wide-ranging partners, will be mostly welcomed by the Caribbean region. So, for that matter, will investments and exports that are seen as advancing energy transition and food security, which are critical components of a comprehensive climate and resilience strategy. However, at this juncture, none of the Caribbean's partners has been fully committed to providing the region all that it needs to tackle the climate crisis, even preceding U.S. efforts to cut foreign assistance. The levels of finance needed to achieve the Caribbean's immense adaptation goals remain elusive.

Despite its relative lack of strategy in the delivery of climate assistance to the region, China will remain a much sought after partner for Caribbean countries. Still, careful and collaborative review of the nature of Chinese engagement and the policies governing it, beginning with efforts, of the sort undertaken here, to quantify and characterize Chinese assistance, but including even deeper analysis, would do much to align Chinese assistance with critical regional needs, while also ensuring that Chinese platforms and pledges are fully leveraged.

To better leverage the growing scope of Chinese climate assistance, Caribbean governments and regional institutions would benefit from more explicitly situating this support within the region's established environmental and climate resilience policy architecture. CARICOM's updated Regional Policy Frameworks for Environment and Natural Resources and Climate Resilience, which

outlines the region's strategic priorities for environmental stewardship, adaptation and mitigation, offers clear benchmarks to guide the integration and assessment of external support, including Chinese assistance.⁵⁷ Aligning new projects with these frameworks can help ensure that cooperation with external partners advances locally defined resilience goals.

Additionally, the Council for Trade and Economic Development (COTED) plays a key role in coordinating regional positions on climate change and ensuring policy coherence across CARICOM member states.⁵⁸ Engaging COTED in the review and alignment of climate-related partnerships, including with China, would support more coordinated and transparent implementation and help avoid fragmentation across the regional landscape.

Regional institutions such as the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Management Agency (CDEMA), the Caribbean Institute for Meteorology & Hydrology (CIMH), and the Caribbean Community Climate Change Centre (CCCCC) also offer important platforms for amplifying the value of external partnerships. The CCCCC already provides policy and technical guidance, executes donor-funded climate projects, and strengthens institutional capacity across member states. Structured collaboration with these climate-focused regional bodies would help ensure that external assistance is embedded within existing institutional frameworks, leverages local expertise, and contributes meaningfully to long-term capacity building and resilience outcomes.

Enhancing institutional capabilities through targeted capacity-building should become a more prominent aspect of Chinese climate assistance to the Caribbean. The CCCCC, given its extensive experience in regional climate policy development, project execution, and institutional strengthening, offers considerable scope for deeper collaboration. Structured partnerships with the CCCCC and related institutions would provide China with valuable local insights, facilitate greater project sustainability, and ensure lasting positive impacts from its assistance efforts.

There would also seem much room for more climate-focused capacity building activity at the institutional level, of the sort that China carries out in other ministries, though often in pursuit of Chinese commercial or political objectives. Additionally, as University of Oxford doctoral candidate Max Nathanson has noted, especially in the absence of U.S. engagement, both China and Caribbean nations would likely benefit from enhanced HA/DR-focused capacity building and informational exchange, noting the

wealth of experience that Caribbean countries bring to this space. The combination of severe climate impacts and limited resources has required Caribbean nations to maximize their assets to respond to climate shocks of the sort that all nations will increasingly face. China and other partner nations would be wise to incorporate elements of Caribbean expertise into their own climate planning.

Finally, if the United States hopes to be viewed by the Caribbean as a partner in the region's development, and to maintain strong political ties to regional governments in the process, then, like the Caribbean's other primary partners, it will need to continue engaging on issues of top concern to the region. Climate, and relatedly, disaster relief and energy, access to finance, and food security, remain chief among these. Staying the course on climate cooperation will be critical for the United States in this era of strategic competition. China's climate assistance is less extensive and less coherent than that traditionally supported by the United States, whether in the Caribbean or elsewhere, but absent U.S. involvement, China will be viewed ever more definitively as a partner of choice on climate, energy transition, and wide-ranging other top-priority objectives. ➡

METHODOLOGY

In the absence of established Chinese climate cooperation policy or even an official definition of overseas climate cooperation among Chinese government institutions, the authors set out to first define China's overseas climate cooperation priorities, relying heavily on Chinese diplomatic discourse on the topic.

To understand the conceptualization and implementation of Chinese direct climate assistance in the Caribbean and other regions, the authors consulted many dozens of official reports, handbooks, and other materials from China's International Development Cooperation Agency (CIDCA)⁶⁶ and its Global Development Promotion Center;⁶⁷ the Ministry of Ecology and Environment and affiliated research institutes, including FECO,⁶⁸ BRI Green Coalition,⁶⁹ and the National Center for Climate Change Strategy and International Cooperation;⁷⁰ the Ministry of Commerce and its affiliates (e.g., CAID,⁷¹ the Agency for International Economic Cooperation,⁷² the China International Center for Economic and Technical Exchanges,⁷³ and the China South-South Cooperation Network⁷⁴); the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and local embassies;⁷⁵ and communications from multilateral forums where China has articulated climate-related positions.

Then, to gauge Chinese messaging and outreach-related priorities in the Caribbean, the authors employed word frequency analysis using Chinese-language reports from the websites of Chinese embassies in the Caribbean region. The samples ranged from 2014 to 2024 and included speeches and articles reflecting official Chinese narratives. Partial results from this exercise are featured Figure 2 in this report.

The embassy reports were filtered based on their use of climate-related terms, including Climate, Climate Change, Sustainable, Clean, Green, Agriculture, Disaster, Hurricane, Energy, Transition (“气候”, “气变”, “可持续”, “清洁”, “绿色”, “农业”, “灾”, “飓”, “能源”, “转型”). Sentences that contained these keywords underwent additional word frequency analysis to evaluate language usage. The authors identified frequent bigrams/trigrams and “neighbors” among the selected sentences. These keywords were then categorized based on the policy area and climate cooperation types, which enabled visualization of Chinese priorities/agenda on climate cooperation over time. The results of this exercise are not featured in this report but helped to shape our analysis of China's evolving climate and messaging priorities in the region.

The authors then turned to quantifying and categorizing Chinese direct climate assistance across the region. Absent a formal definition of Chinese overseas climate cooperation or official articulation of Chinese climate priorities Caribbean, the authors established internal guidelines for identifying and documenting China's direct climate-related assistance, focusing only on CARICOM countries and Cuba, Dominican Republic, and Haiti.

The authors selected and assembled projects of the following sorts by consulting wide-ranging, publicly available sources, including China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs,⁷⁶ yidaiyilu.com,⁷⁷ Chinese embassy websites, local government sources, Caribbean other international media reports, AidData⁷⁸, and Inter-American Dialogue foreign direct investment⁷⁹ as well as finance data.⁸⁰

Infrastructure: “Hard” infrastructure with climate-conscious designs or features (e.g., stadium with rainwater collection features/solar panels)

Renewable Energy: Projects or equipment that generate renewable energy (e.g., photovoltaic panels or wind farms)

Sustainable Equipment: Equipment that reduces emissions (e.g., electric buses)

Food Security: Projects designed to boost agricultural productivity amid climate change (e.g., specialized food-processing factories or agriscience centers)

Climate Adaptation: Longer-term projects aimed at adapting to/mitigating the effects of climate change (e.g., construction of seawalls to combat rising sea levels)

Disaster Alleviation: Short-term assistance following natural disasters (e.g., aid following hurricanes or floods)

The authors also tracked the mechanisms through which these examples of climate assistance were carried out. They include donations, construction projects, financing (e.g., project finance or buyer's credits), technical cooperation, educational exchange, and what China's has called "cooperation projects," or 合作项目, which include China-host country joint construction and other not easily categorized projects.

By including foreign direct investment among the mechanisms for Chinese direct climate cooperation, we notably risk over-representing Chinese assistance. Typically, FDI projects are not included in other foreign government accounts of their own climate assistance, for instance. And some investment projects are only loosely climate-related, having included a small amount of renewable energy or other presumably climate-friendly infrastructure. We have determined to count these projects, however—in part because China considers investments, including and especially infrastructure development, to be an integral part of climate strategy. The authors have sought to define and categorize Chinese engagement according to the types of climate assistance typically offered by Caribbean partners, while still accounting for distinctions in Chinese methods and outreach.

That said, we do not include trade in our accounting of Chinese climate assistance, even though China upholds its sales of new energy and other technologies as a form of climate assistance. We nevertheless feature some analysis of China's exports of these goods to the region. Here, we relied on China Customs data to track China's export of sustainable equipment to the region from 2015-2024. Specifically, we referenced China Customs' HS codes for wind turbines, solar panels, batteries, and electric vehicles.

Establishing the dollar value of Chinese climate cooperation and assistance has proven quite difficult and therefore isn't analyzed in much depth in this study. Project values seldom publicly available, especially when projects are featured as part of Economic and Technological Cooperation Agreements (ETCAs) or memorandums of understanding.

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The SSCCF dilemma faced by MoEE is further evidenced by the yet lack of any document suggesting the fund's existence, rather, a set ministerial documents (生态环境部 和国家国际发展合作署. “应对气候变化南南合作物资援助项目管理暂行办法 [Interim Measures for the Management of the South-South Cooperation Material Assistance Project on Addressing Climate Change].” 生态环境部办公厅, November 26, 2020. https://www.mee.gov.cn/xxgk2018/xxgk/xxgk03/202011/t20201127_810184.html.) are used as a stopgap to facilitate south-south cooperation on climate change since 2020, whose titles clearly limits these projects' scope to material donations.

In contrast, the South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund (SSCAF) operated by Ministry of Commerce (MofCOM) is regulated by a specific guideline (“商务部关于《南南合作援助基金项目申报与实施管理办法（试行）》（征求意见稿）公开征求意见 [Trial Measures for the Application and Implementation Management of South-South Cooperation Assistance Fund Projects].” 商务部, September 9, 2016. https://tfs.mofcom.gov.cn/lfzqyj/art/2016/art_2bb771bb60734dd5afbf63553a021bea.html.) that grants the fund flexibility in project scale/type, implementation and equipment/material procurement, though it is worth nothing that the SSCAF (now re-branded as the Global Development and South-South Cooperation Fund) is intended for a wider array of developmental aid, not only those related to climate change.

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